STUDY PROJECT

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THE EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

BY

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This paper focuses on the evolution of Israeli political and military doctrine. The paper examines the basic factors that determine the development of doctrine on strategic and operational levels. After examining the permanent factors that define doctrine, particular attention is given to recent changes and the dynamic nature of the Israeli doctrine.

Israel's policy and military doctrine have essentially remained the same since the 1950s, despite the impact of far-reaching changes. These changes include: increased involvement of superpowers in the region; Israel's increased

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dependence on U.S. aid; Israel's international isolation; the peace
agreement with Egypt; the increasing importance of the Arab World and "oil
power"; Israel's demographic and economic difficulties; the decreasing
military threat to Israel's existence; and an increasingly divided Israeli
society. Other problems discussed are the development of new military
technology, and the ability of the Arab nations to counter Israeli offensive
military doctrine.

The paper concludes that Israel must increase the importance of the political
component relative to the military component in its national security policy.
Israel must begin to take political risks for peace at the expense of its
quest for absolute security, while still retaining its military power as the
most significant factor to guarantee its existence.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

THE EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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THE EVOLUTION OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

INTRODUCTION

> It is clear. . .that all Israeli military concepts
> from the founding of the nation until today, are only
> footnotes to the military thought of the 1950s.
> Therefore it is important to know what was the past
> Israeli doctrine. Even though we add during the
> years, some color and daub, improving and renovating
> --and also spoiling--the basis of the doctrine has not
> been changed.[1]

From its creation Israel has tried to avoid conflict but was
forced to fight six wars. There are people who disagree with
Israel's national security policy mainly because military victor-
ies have not caused the most significant political achievement of
peace. Israel's national security policy is more "oral law" than
"written law";[2] nevertheless, one can formulate the doctrine on
which the policy is based thus: There is a threat to the existence
and the security of Israel; Israel does not have strategic allies
and it does not have the ability to resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict by, or mainly by, military power and means.

The Israeli national command authority decided to base the
security on the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and not place reli-
ance on external factors. They determined that Israel would main-
tain a full self-defense capability based on a small, highly
professional active army, and a large, skilled reserve component
that can be very quickly mobilized. Israel will fight only on the
strategic defense, to wage as short a war as possible, away from
Israel's population center of infrastructure in order to achieve

a quick and clear decisive victory with minimum material losses and casualties. The political and military intention is defensive, but the strategy to achieve it is offensive. Consequently, if war breaks out, it must be fought on the enemy's territory as soon as possible. Thus, Israel's intention is a first strike with surprise if the political conditions make this possible.

Deterrence and decisive victory based on conventional power are the main elements of Israel's national security policy, but there are some other aspects which were developed over the course of time:

1. The West Bank, Golan Heights and Gaza serve as a security zone around Israel.

2. Reliance on superpower support and guarantees for the existence of Israel in case of serious difficulty.

3. <u>Perception</u> of Israeli nuclear capability to influence the behavior and military objectives of the enemy (there is no reliable information about Israeli nuclear capability, only speculation, therefore, it will not be dealt with in this paper).

Although after 1967 Israel succeeded in improving, to some degree, its geostrategic situation and accumulating additional security zones, the feeling of insecurity which characterizes Israeli policy has not been changed. The psychological element plays a fundamental function in Israel's feeling of insecurity and the quest for absolute security. The history, culture, and tradition of the Jewish people have created constant efforts to attain maximum security by all means available. This implies that in the future Israel will aspire to secire additional security

zones.[3] Over the years the IDF has had to contend with a continual series of low intensity conflict and preparation for conventional war.[4] Readiness needs and "routine security measures" sometimes conflict with preparation needs, but on the other hand create high standards of combat capability and readiness. Israel struggles with the "routine security measures" in three ways:[5]

1. Defense - protection of the civilian population, reconnaissance, building tactical infrastructure and intelligence.

2. Tactical offense - warning, preventive, and destabilizing operations, and direct strikes against terrorism to reduce the terrorism zone of action. Israel has made it clear that every Arab state bears the responsibility for terrorist actions that originate from its territory. Israel will punish the Arab states which support or sponsor terrorism.

3. Theater offense -actions of the IDF long range arm such as the Entebbe Raid, bombing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Tunisia and bombing atomic reactor in Iraq. Not always did these punitive actions achieve their goals, sometimes even they escalated the conflict.

Israel's counterterrorism strategy, on the whole, has been effective and led to low casualties. This strategy has allowed her citizens to lead normal lives. It has also succeeded in avoiding strikes against Israel's most important interests, and created a deterrent.[6]

This paper will only deal with the conventional level of war. The purpose of this paper is to examine and analyze these founda-

tion of Israel's national security policy during the years 1948 to
1989.

ENDNOTES

1. Israel Tal (MG), "Israel's Doctrine of National Security
- Background and Dynamics" in <u>Maarachat</u> (Hebrew), Vol. 253, Tel
Aviv: IDF's official publishing house, December 1976, p. 2.

2. Avraham Ayalon, "Israel National Security Doctrine 1948-
1988" in <u>Skira Shodshit</u> (Hebrew), No. 3-4, Tel Aviv: IDF's
Official Publishing House, April 1988, p. 11.

3. Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Concept of National Security
and the Prospects of Peace" in <u>The Middle East in Dynamics of a
Conflict</u>, ed. by Gabrial Sheffer, Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation,
1975, pp. 235-275. Michael I. Handel, <u>The Evolution of Israeli
Strategy: The Psychology of Insecurity and the Quest for Absolute
Security</u>, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1989.
Israel Tal (MG), "Israel's Doctrine of National Security - Back-
ground and Dynamics" in <u>Jerusalem Quarterly</u>, No. 4, Jerusalem:
The Middle East Institute, Summer 1977, pp. 44-57.

4. Aharon Yariv, "Thirty Years of Security" in <u>Skira
Shodshit</u> (Hebrew), No. 3-4, Tel Aviv: IDF's Official Publishing
House, April 1978, p. 8.

5. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 8-10. Ayalon, <u>Israel National Security</u>,
pp. 8-10.

6. Jonathan Shimshoni, <u>Israel and Conventional Deterrence
Border Warfare From 1953 to 1970</u>, Cornell Studies in Security
Affairs, Cornell University Press, 1988.

CHAPTER II

BASIC FACTORS IN THE REGION

GEOGRAPHY

Israel is a classic case of a nation whose strategy is dominated by geography. The location, form, size and localization of any country in any region, has a large impact on the country's national strength.[1] Israel's location on the continental bridge between Africa and Asia has great strategic importance.[2] Its location in the midst of the Arab world creates a buffer zone between Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt. (See Map 1.) Consequently it creates for Israel, two fronts which force Israel to split her national strength between both fronts. In the north and east there is a threat to the existence of Israel from the "Eastern front" posed by Syria, Iraq and Jordan. In the south (even after the Camp David Accords) there is a potential threat to create an Arab coalition that includes Libya, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Mahgreb Arab countries. Israel's length and narrow width create great difficulties for movement of forces from one front to the other. In addition, the narrow width creates long borders and a lack of strategic depth. (See Maps 2 and 3.)[3]

Every part of Israel is less than five minutes flying time from the Arab states, and every part of Israel is exposed to Arab missiles. (See Maps 5, 6 and 7.) The lack of strategic depth creates two basic problems: lack of warning time and an inability to trade "space for time" in order to regroup and organize its

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defense forces. Large parts of Israel are exposed to Arab artillery. (See Map 5.) If Israel goes back to 1967 borders (the unlabeled green line), then the vital areas of the state--the population centers and infrastructure--will be in the range of all weapon systems, even those available to guerrillas and low technology armed forces.[4]

Map 1.

ISRAELI CONQUESTS 1967

Source: Martin Gilbert, Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, New
York: Macmillan, 1975, p. 70.

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Map 2.

Distances -- Center

Mediterranean Sea

30 miles Safed
Akko
Haifa
Sea of Galilee
Tiberias
Nazareth
21 miles
35 km
Afula
6 miles
10 km
Hadera
9 miles
15 km
Netanya
SAMARIA
Metropolitan Tel-Aviv
11 miles
18 km
50 miles
Ashdod
22 miles
36 km
Jerusalem
Ashkelon
Dead Sea
7 miles
11 km
Kiryat Gat
JUDAEA
Gaza
10 miles
16 km
Arad
Beersheba

8

Map 3.

Distances — North

Mediterranean Sea

5 miles
8 km

7.5 miles
12 km

33 miles
53 km

Safed

Akko

Haifa

Sea of
Galilee

Tiberias

21.5 miles
34 km

Nazareth

o Afula

Beit
Shean

2.5 miles
4 km

o Hadera

6 miles
10 km

SAMARIA

Source: Institute of Students and Faculty of Israel, _The Arab-
Israeli Conflict in Maps_, Jerusalem: 1984, p. 54.

Map 4.

Golan Heights

Lebanon

Syria

Israel

Kinneret

- Overlooks (Controls) Israel's villages and cities in the north.
- A desolate area the size of Queens.
- The width of the whole area in dispute is 15 miles.
- The heights control the Kineret, Israel's only lake.
- The Heights dominate and rule the valley below.

Source: Institute of Students and Faculty of Israel, The Arab-
Israeli Conflict in Maps, Jerusalem: 1984, p. 34.

Map 5.

Missile And Artillery Ranges

Artillery	Calibre	Range
	155 mm	14 miles / 22 km
	175 mm	20 miles / 32 km
	180 mm	26 miles / 42 km
Missiles (Hawk)		
	360 mm	22 miles / 35 km

Source: Institute of Students and Faculty of Israel, <u>The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Maps</u>, Jerusalem: 1984, p. 52.

Map 6.

Flying Time Between Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and Israel

Map showing Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Jordan with flying time arrows:
- 10 minutes to Jerusalem — 180 miles (from Turayf to Jerusalem)
- 12 minutes to Israel — 210 miles (from Gurayet)
- 6 minutes to Eilat — 125 miles (from Tabug to Eilat)

Source: Institute of Students and Faculty of Israel, The Arab-
Israeli Conflict in Maps, Jerusalem: 1984, p. 56.

Map 7.

Vulnerability of Israel

Map 8.

ISRAEL'S SENSE OF INSECURITY
1949 - 1967

Source: Gilbert Martin, <u>Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict</u>, 1975, p. 102.

Map 9.

Middle East Arms Supplies: SCUD

On 2 November 1973 it was announced in Washington that Egypt had received Soviet surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 160 miles. These 'Scud' missiles can be armed with either high explosive warheads, or nuclear warheads. Washington later confirmed that Syria had also been sent 'Scud' missiles from the Soviet Union. These, if fired from Sassa, could hit Beersheba

'Scud' range if fired from Ismailia

'Scud' range if fired from a line 50 miles east of the Suez Canal

'Scud' range if fired from the pre-1967 cease-fire line (Israel's borders from 1949 to 1967)

.... Israel's Sinai border, 1949-1967

LEBANON

Beirut

SYRIA

Damascus

Mediterranean

Sea

Sassa

Safed

Haifa

Afula   Irbid

Tel Aviv

Jerusalem   Amman

Ashdod

Gaza

Arad   JORDAN

El Arish   Beersheba

Negev

50 miles

Ismailia

Cairo

Suez   Maan

Mitla Pass

Sinai

Eilat

EGYPT

0 10 20 30 40 50

Miles

SAUDI ARABIA

© Martin Gilbert

Source: Gilbert Martin, <u>Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict</u>, 1975, p. 96.

The distance between the forward line (current borders) and vital areas, the proportion between the length of Israel's forward line and the size of the area which it defends are demonstrated in Tables 1, 2, and 3. From these tables we see that:

1. By every standard, geographical conditions create a difficult strategic situation for Israel (especially before 1967).

2. The geographic factors could definitely make it easy for any aggressive and determined enemy to detach part of Israel.

3. The vital areas of Israel-- the main population centers and infrastructure--are very close to Israel's borders.

4. Without the West Bank, Israel's strategic depth problem becomes even more difficult. The "coastal plateau," with its population and industrial components, is located 8 to 20 miles from the West Bank. (See Map 2.)

In addition to the Arab states directly bordering on Israel, Israeli leaders have always had to include a number of other Arab states on their list of potential enemies. Their conclusion is based on past experience when forces from almost all Arab states arrived in the theater to fight against Israel in the 1967 Six Day War and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. This fact causes severe "psychological pressure" upon Israel. Consequently, the Israeli ecurity view is always the worse case analysis, i.e., fighting on all fronts against the combined Arab armies at the same time.

Table 1: Distances Between the Forward Line of Israel
and Her Vital Areas

State Bordering on Israel	Israel's Forward Line	Distance From Forward Line to Vital Area (Straight Line, Km)	Distance From Forward Line to Capitals of Neighboring Countries (Direct Line, Km)
Lebanon	Green Line (1949 (Armistice Line)	32 to Haifa (Krayot Suburbs)	65 to Beirut
Syria	Green Line (1949)	55 to Haifa	47 to Damascus
	Cease-Fire Line (1974)	80 to Haifa	
Jordan	Green Line (1949)	30 to Greater Haifa 17 to Greater Tel Aviv 0 to Jerusalem	35 to Amman
	Cease-Fire Line (1974)	50 to Greater Haifa 64 to Greater Tel Aviv 40 to Jerusalem	
Egypt	International Boundary	90 to Greater Tel Aviv	310 to Cairo

Source: Yariu Aharon, "Strategic Depth" in **Marrachot** (Hebrew),
Vol. 270-271, Tel Aviv: IDF's Official Publishing House, October
1976, pp. 21-22.

Table 2: Proportion Between the Length of Israel
Forward Line and the Size of Area Which It Defends

Israel's Forward Line	Total Length	Land-Sea		Ratio Forward Line-Defense Area	
Green Line (1949)	1,275	Land -	985	Land only	13:1
		Sea -	290	Land & Sea	10:1
Cease-Fire Line (1967)	1,742	Land -	637	Land Only	86:1
		Sea -	1105	Land & Sea	31:1
After Evacuation of Sinai	1,096	Land -	734	Land Only	26:1
		Sea -	362	Land & Sea	20:1

Table 3: Proportion in Other Countries

Country	Ratio Between Length of Line and the Defense Space (Land Only)
Egypt	230:1
Lebanon	18:1
Syria	56:1
Jordan	40:1
West Germany	60:1
France	178:1
South Korea	256:1
South Africa	233:1
China	421:1
USA	647:1
USSR	929:1

Source: Yariu Aharon, "Strategic Depth" in **Marrachot** (Hebrew),
Vol. 270-271, Tel Aviv: IDF's Official Publishing House, October
1976, pp. 21-22.

Some have argued that in the era of missiles, modern aircraft, and sophisticated weapons systems, strategic depth has only limited value. This argument is totally groundless, especially in the Israeli case, for several reasons.[5]

1. The experience of modern war has shown that one does not conquer any large area just by bombing it.

2. Without occupying an area, there can be no victory in a war. For conquest, land forces are needed and, therefore, strategic depth plays a most important role.

3. Proper handling of the strategic depth issue may reduce a potential aggressor's temptation to go to war.

TOPOGRAPHY

The topographic nature of the borders in the north is varied. There is no natural barrier with Lebanon, but the terrain is not suitable for the deployment of large forces. This gives an advantage to the defender who is properly deployed in time. With the Golan Heights in the northeast, the Rukade and Yarmuk Rivers form a limited barrier. However, entire area lacks barriers in depth, and thus the deployment of large armored forces is possible. It should be noted that the present forward line does not place Israel at the dangerous disadvantage it suffered in terms of the 1949 armistice line. The Golan Heights give the great advantage of full control of the Jordan Valley and Hachula Valley to any army on the Heights. (See maps 4 and 10.) With Jordan in the east, the Jordan River constitutes a limited barrier which may be used for defense, in conjunction with the mountain ridges west of

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the river. Large armored forces can operate in this terrain. The West Bank gives a topographical advantage of full control of the "coastal plateau" and other large parts in the northern and southern parts of Israel (see Map 11). With Egypt in the south, the border goes through desert terrain, alternately flat and mountainous, therefore, in some parts easy to defend and in others more difficult.

The maritime frontiers are not too long and should not create a difficult problem of defense. Along the coastal plateau Israel has important concentrations of population (65 percent) and infrastructure (80 percent) whose damage or temporary loss would strike a serious physical and moral blow to the population. Undoubtedly, Israel's lack of strategic depth and the physical and geographical limitations cause "psychological pressure" and feelings of insecurity. Thus geography has been and will continue to be a dominant factor in Israeli national security policy, even in the age of technology.

Map 10.

Cross-Section Galilee-Kinneret-Golan Heights

Source: Institute of Students and Faculty of Israel, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict in Maps*, Jerusalem: 1983, p. 36.

Map 11.

Cross-Section Herzliya
Nablus (Shechem)—Jordan River

DEMOGRAPHY

The population in Israel in 1988 was 4.4 million, 3.6 million Jews (82 percent of the population) and 790,000 Israeli Arabs (18 percent of the population), a ratio of 4.6:1.[6] The annual rate of population growth of the Jewish community is 13 to 1,000, and that of the Israeli Arabs is 30.6 to 1,000.[7] The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has drawn up a scenario for the year 2000.[8] Under this scenario 4.2-4.3 million Jews and 1.2 million Israeli Arabs will live inside the Green Line (1967 border); the ratio will be 3.5:1.

The geographical distribution of Israel's population shows that the population is not deployed equally throughout the country. Sixty percent of the population is concentrated along the "coastal plateau" near the Mediterranean Sea on 12 percent of the country's area.[9] In 1987, 90 percent of the population resided in urban areas, with the Jews living along the coast and in the valleys, and the Arabs living in the hills and mountains. In some of these areas such as Galilee, the Arabs have the majority.

The composition of the population in Eretz Israel[10] is completely different. The total population in 1987[11] was 5.8 million, 3.6 million Jews and 2.2 million Arabs for a ratio of 1.6:1. It is expected, however, that by the year 2000,[12] the total population will be 7.3 - 8.0 million, with 4.2-4.3 million Jews and 3.1-3.7 million Arabs, for a ratio of .95:1 - .93:1.

All these estimates have been done before the beginning of he
mass Russian Jewish immigration. The Russian Jewish immigration
began in 1989 and, according to some estimates, about 500,000 Jews
expected to immigrate to Israel in the next 5 years. The
demographic balance will be somewhat changed for the mid-term.
However, this would not change the demographic balance for the
long term.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI BALANCE OF POWER: DIFFERENT POSSIBLE ESTIMATES ACCORDING TO FRONTS, COALITIONS, OR WORST CASE ANALYSIS (AN ISRAELI VIEW)*

	ISRAEL	DIRECT EASTERN FRONT		RATIO OF ST+J5 IS	WESTERN FRONT EGYPT	RATIO OF ES+S+JO IS	EXTENDED EASTERN FRONT		RATIO OF ST+JO+IR+S IS	RATIO OF EAST & WEST FRONTS ST+JO+IR+S +ES IS	LIBYA	RATIO OF EAST & WEST ST+JO+IR+S+ES+LY IS	OTHER STATES DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS
		SYRIA	JORDAN				IRAQ	SAUDI ARABIA					
"POPULATION (1989)	4.40 JEWS 3.61 ARABS 0.79	12	2.9	1:4.1	54.7	1:19.3	18	15	1:13.3	1:28.4	4	1:29.6	...
GDP BN (1985) $	22.9 BN	20.27	3.99	1:1	46.45	1:3.1	36.5 (1986)	77.4 (1986)	1:6	1:8	25.76 (1984)	1:9.2	...
DEFENSE EXPENDITURE (BN $) 1986	4.3 BN	3.47	0.735	1:1	5.2	1:2.2	10	16.2	1:7.1	1:8.2	1.4 (1986)	1:8.6	...
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL (IN THOUSANDS) 1987/1988	440	605	115	1:1.6	960	1:3.9	1,035	72	1:4.2	1:5.4	115	1:5.6	...
COMBAT AIRCRAFT 1987-88	682	650	107	1:1.1	600	1:2	705	190	1:2.4	1:3.3	537	1:4.1	...
TANKS 1987/1988	3790	4130	1,025	1:1.35	2400	1:2	5500	550	1:2.9	1:3.6	2800	1:4.3	...
APC'S 1987/1988	5000	3900	1,465	1:1	4100	1:1.9	5000	3,140	1:2.7	1:3.5	2000	1:3.9	...

Source: Michael I. Handel, The Evolution of Israeli Strategy, p. 4.

TRENDS IN ARAB-ISRAELI MANPOWER (FORCE) RATIOS SINCE 1967*

PERIOD	1967 SIX DAY WAR	1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR	1987		
ISRAEL	250,000	350,000	REGULAR RESERVES TOTAL	130,000 310,000 440,000	
EGYPT	250,000	650,000	REGULAR RESERVES TOTAL	380,000 600,000 980,000	
JORDAN	56,000	60,000	REGULAR RESERVES TOTAL	70,000 45,000 115,000	
SYRIA	70,000	150,000	REGULAR RESERVES TOTAL	306,000 300,000 606,000	
IRAQ	80,000	250,000	REGULAR RESERVES TOTAL	555,000 480,000 1,035,000	
TOTAL ARAB	456,000	1,100,000	2,736,000		
ISRAEL/ARABS RATIO	1:1.6	1:3.1	1:8		

SOURCE: ADAN "QUALITY AND QUANITY IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR" IN OFER AND KOBER (EDS) QUALITY AND QUANITY (TEL AVIV MAARACHOT 1985), AND LEVRAN (ED) THE MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE PP. 428-429

Source: Michael I. Handel, The Evolution of Israeli Strategy, p. 21.

Demographic constraints have both domestic and external meanings for the Israeli national security process. Israel understood in the past and understands today that quantitative inferiority relative to the Arab states is clear and eternal. It cannot be changed and, in fact, the gap will increase in the future because of the demographic revolution in the Arab world. The population ratio between Israel and Syria and Jordan is 1:4.1; if Iraq and Saudi Arabia are included, the ratio is 1:13.3; and, in a worse case analysis, adding Libya and Egypt, the ratio is 1:29.6.[13] (See Table 4.)

This demographic situation creates basic problems in the Israeli strategy:

1. Demographic constraints set an upper limit on the size of the armed forces Israel can mobilize.

2. There is a huge, unavoidable gap in the quantity of manpower between Israel and the Arab world.

3. Because of demographic and economic constraints, Israel must have the majority of her forces in a reserve system. In addition, Israel cannot develop a long war capability; thus, every war must be a short war and the results must be decisive--the complete defeat of the enemy forces.

4. Because of demographic constraints, Israel must minimize losses and casualties.

5. The Israeli demography problem creates another important dimension to the feeling of insecurity and to the "psychological pressure" on the strategy and leadership of Israel (feelings of being a Jewish "drop" in the Arab "ocean").

6. The internal demographic problem calls into question the basic character of the nation in the long term. The latest dynamics of the demography lead necessarily to the separation of one group from the other, particularly when the two groups are divided by communal, cultural, religious, economic and, particularly, national differences.

7. The Israeli requirement for periods of active duty for the reserve army causes some difficulties on the national economy in peacetime. In wartime, however, the economy cannot bear full mobilization for an extended period of time.

The Arab demographic advantage has always led Israelis to seek qualitative solutions in all areas:

1. To build quality manpower based on education, motivation, technical skill and morale. (To obtain the best we can from the quantity we have.)

2. Technological superiority--to promote a real technological advantage over the Arabs.

3. Skill superiority--To develop a high level of technical military skills, night fighting, initiative, etc.

4. Quantitative superiority of total Israeli firepower (based on the Israeli air force) over the Arabs.

Israel understands that the solutions for the quantitative gaps must be based on qualitative solutions on the one hand and trying to reduce the quantitative gaps by establishing a reserve system on the other. In periods of quiet, the nation devoted itself to its main national objectives--creating a democratic society, absorbing immigrants, developing educational

opportunities, a democratic justice system, and economic growth. In times of crisis or war, the nation's citizens donned their uniforms. This enables Israel to field, in wartime, the largest army in the world in relation to the size of the population.[14] Israel's Military Participation Ration (MPR) is about 15 percent (the IDF manpower force is 540,000 out of a Jewish population of 3,610,000). By the same Israeli MPR standards, the Arab world should have a 16 million-man force--they have armed forces that number about 3.0 million.[15]

The tremendous quantitative gaps between Israel and the Arabs are dramatically offset due to the separation of the Arab world. Consequently, in all past Arab-Israeli wars, the Arabs could not establish a "large coalition" that would intensively mobilize all their resources for war, nor would they achieve political, strategic and operational coordination among the respective Arab states. The disunity of the Arab world and each country's different objectives are one of the most important elements of Israel's national security doctrine which is to prevent the establishment of a hostile "large coalition." The Arab advantage in population cannot come to bear in the operational level because of the geographical conditions in the area. There is a real limit to the amount of power related to the geographical space. Even more important are the limits of power that can be concentrated on every axis. Therefore, in wartime it is impossible to bring to bear the quantitative advantage of the Arab world.

There is another factor which reduces the quantitative gap. This is the cohesiveness of Israeli society relative to Arab

society. Israelis as an educated nation have a real advantage over the Arabs in the degree of technology and science. In addition, Israeli society is characterized by broad national consensus on national security issues. Over the years, the state has learned to efficiently mobilize all national resources required for defense needs. Therefore, Israel has been better prepared to accomplish its military objectives than the Arab world. The gaps between both societies gave the IDF the advantage over the other side in morale, motivation, leadership and command, particularly at the lower levels. Israeli society created a superior technological and industrial capability which gives it the qualitative force multiplier of superior military equipment. In this way, the military industry has added another strong element to Israel's national security.

ECONOMY

The Israeli defense budget is that portion of the national budget that belongs to the Ministry of Defense. The defense budget consists of two main elements. The first element is the "maintenance" budget, designed for preserving the existence of the IDF and financing its current readiness training and routine security measures. The second element is the "build up" budget for building the force and its combat power. The maintenance budget constitutes 80 percent of the defense budget and is growing. Defense needs are a function of the Arab threat, but also a function of the country's economic condition.[16]

Israel lacks almost all natural resources in its small territory. Since Israel could not prepare for war while concurrently developing a modern Western state, so it has had to obtain economic and military support from outside sources. It receives extensive economic and military aid from three principle sources: The U.S. Government, the Jewish Diaspora, and German war reparations.

The growth rate of the Israeli GNP in real terms was[17] 10.2 percent in the period 1955-1961, 7.7 percent from 1962 to 1966, 11.6 percent between 1968-1972, and 3.7 percent from 1973 to 1980. After 1980 the growth rate fell sharply to 1 percent. While the growth of the Israeli GNP continued to decline, defense expenditures, as a percentage of GNP, increased as follows (see Figure 1): in 1954 Israel spent 6.3 percent of its GNP on defense; between 1962-1966, 10 percent; 1968-1972, 27 percent; 1973-1982, 30 percent; and 1983-1989, approximately 20 percent. While there has been a steady increase in defense spending as a percent of GNP, the rate of growth of Israel's GNP has continued to decline since the 1973 war.

The defense burden on the Israeli economy since 1984 has caused a reduction in real terms of the defense budget, decreasing both in absolute and in relative terms, as a percent of the GNP and government expenditures. Some of the indications of the weakness of Israel's economy today are:[19] (see Table 6). The GNP is frozen; total governmental expenditures exceed 100 percent of the GNP; and the external national debt is $25 billion. From the 1970s, more than 15 percent of Israeli industry is involved in defense production.

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENT OF GNP

ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF GROWTH OF GNP

(%)

50 40 30 20 10 0

54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

A COMPARISON OF THE RATE OF GROWTH OF ISRAELI GNP AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENT OF GNP

Source: Michael I. Handel, The Evolution of Israeli Strategy, p. 21.

Table No. 6:   Israeli macroeconomic indicators - 1981-1989

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	Est. 1989
Population (Thousands)	3578	4034	4115	4200	4266	4337	4407	4477	4550
Govt Budget NIS* Millions	235.9	572.4	1880.1	11375	34171	37018	45478	54418	55211
Percentage Distribution	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Defense	27.6	25.2	21.6	19.1	19.4	22.5	20.2	16.7	19.3
Debt Service	24.9	32.6	40.5	51.9	54.1	42.0	44.6	48.3	38.7
Ordinary Budget	37.0	32.3	30.8	23.5	21.4	29.0	29.5	30.0	35.8
Development Budget	10.5	10.0	7.1	5.5	5.1	6.5	5.7	5.0	6.2
GDP NIS* Millions Current Prices	263.4	593.9	1537	7596	28076	43855	55640	66958	80000
U.S. Dollars (Billions)	34.3	34.7	35.6	36.8	37.8	39.2	41.9	41.9	42
Growth Rate 1988 Prices	1.2%	2.6%	2.6%	2.2%	3.8%	3.7%	5.1%	1.7%	0.2%
Total Exports U.S. $ (Millions)	10765	10578	10477	10823	11245	12126	14288	15656	17200
Total Imports U.S. $ (Millions)	14908	15021	15219	15476	15092	15954	20025	20982	21000
Total Deficit U.S. $ (Millions)	4145	4443	4742	4654	3847	3827	5807	5326	3800
External Debt U.S. $ (Millions)	17420	20209	22070	22882	23272	24130	25459	24372	-
Consumer Prices (%)	101.5	131.5	190.7	444.9	185.2	19.7	16.1	16.4	20.0

* NIS - New Israeli Shekels
Source:
Government of Israel, Ministry of Finance, Israeli Macroeconomic
Indicators. 1981-1989, 1989.

American aid to Israel is both military and economic. Of the total aid package, 69.5 percent is a grant and 30.5 percent a loan (see Table 7). In the last 41 years, U.S. foreign aid to Israel has totalled $44.5 billion. Of this amount, Israel has received $38 billion in the last 14 years--38 percent in economic aid and 62 percent in military aid.[20] U.S. foreign aid to Israel began with the establishment of the state when economic aid of $50-$60 million was provided annually. In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. aid continued on a relatively small scale. In 1969 U.S. government loans were some $54 million; in 1970, $345 million; and in 1971, $260 million. Following the 1973 war, U.S. aid to Israel expanded exponentially, reaching an annual level of $2 billion.[21] U.S. aid to Israel in the 1970s enabled the Israeli economy to survive two serious shocks:[22] (1) the 1973 war, giving rise to serious losses and necessitating renewed military rearmament on a high level; (2) the increased cost of oil and raw materials immediately following the war. U.S. aid to Israel in the 1980s expanded to a level of $3 billion (in 1985-86, $4 billion was provided) and changed significantly in its character (see Table 7) in the following ways:

1. Increases in the grant portion of the aid package. From 1981 all economic aid was a grant and from 1985 all the military aid was in the form of a grant.

2. In 1985 and 1986, for the first time, special additional emergency aid of $1.5 billion was provided.

3. Israel's interest payment obligations to the U.S. reached $1 billion annually. Payments on the principle of these loans

approached $200 million annually. Of the cumulative economic aid that Israel receives annually, $1.2 billion returns to the U.S. in loan interest and principle payments.[23] In 1988 Israel's debt to the U.S. was $10 billion.[24]

As noted, U.S. military aid provided to Israel in the past 16 years has been significant. Specifically, without U.S. aid:

1. Large arms acquisitions required could never be obtained from local production, especially in the period 1973-76.

2. Israel could not have invested the necessary funds and resources for the rehabilitation and enhancement of the IDF.

3. Israel would have had difficulties in negotiating foreign loans.

4. Israel would have had to invest a larger percentage of its GNP in defense spending.

5. Israel could not have curbed escalating inflation in the mid-1980s.

6. Israel's standard of living would have declined significantly.

7. Israel could not have increased its economic growth.

8. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Israel would not have received an extra $300-400 million from the military aid package.

Table No. 7: U.S. Security Assistance and Economic Support
Funds 1949 - 1989 (in Millions of $)

	Total Assistance			Security Assistance			Economic Support Fund		
	Total	Grant	Loan	Total	Grant	Loan	Total	Grant	Loan
1949-1952	87	87	-	-	-	-	87	87	-
1953-1961	508	259	249	1	-	1	507	259	248
1962-1965	259	23	236	39	-	39	220	23	197
1966-1970	410	5	405	237	-	237	173	5	168
1971	634	3	631	545	-	545	89	3	86
1972	462	58	404	300	-	300	162	58	104
1973	464	104	360	300	-	300	164	104	60
1974	2599	1590	1009	2483	1500	983	116	90	26
1975	701	467	234	300	100	200	401	367	34
1976	2535	1395	1140	1700	850	850	835	545	290
1977	1788	1010	778	1000	500	500	788	510	278
1978	1817	1050	767	1000	500	500	817	550	267
1979	1845	1054	791	1000	500	500	845	554	291
1980	1840	1054	786	1000	500	500	840	554	286
1981	1992	1294	700	1200	500	700	792	792	-
1982	2219	1369	850	1400	550	850	819	819	-
1983	2498	1548	950	1700	750	950	798	798	-
1984	2623	1773	850	1700	850	850	923	923	-
1985	2600	2600	-	1400	1400	-	1200	1200	-
1986	2871	2871	-	1723	1723	-	1148	1148	-
1987	3000	3000	-	1800	1800	-	1200	1200	-
1988	3000	3000	-	1800	1800	-	1200	1200	-
1989	3000	3000	-	1800	1800	-	1200	1200	-
Special assistance to prepare the IDF in the Negev									
1979	3000	800	2200	3000	800	2200	-	-	-
1981	200	-	200	200	-	200	-	-	-
Special Economic Support Fund									
1985	750	750	-	-	-	-	750	750	-
1986	750	750	-	-	-	-	750	750	-
Total	44450	30912	13538	27626	16423	11203	16824	14489	2335

Source:
Elan Plato, "U.S. aid to Israel - Advantage or Disadvantage" in
The First Conference of the Ministry of Finance 1989, p. 12.

U.S. Foreign Aid 1948-1989
(Billions of $)

Total — Grant —+— Loan —*—
Tot Sec Assist. —□— Tot Economic Spt —*—

49 53 62 66 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89

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In contrast to Israel's economic situation, the situation in the Arab world is absolutely different. The growth of "oil power" made a large change in the economic capability of the Arab states, with corresponding growth in the resources that are available for defense expenditures. The ratio between Israeli GNP and that of the Arab states is 1:9.2, and the ratio in defense expenditures is 1:8.6. (See Table 4.)

Currently, because of the decreasing prices of oil in the world, the ability of the Arab states to invest money on defense has temporarily decreased, but the Arab's economic situation is much better than Israel's.

The implications of Israel's economic limitations on strategy are that:

1. Israel's strategic dependence on the U.S. limits its strategic freedom of action.

2. Israel will have to cut defense expenditures in order to improve its economic conditions.

3. a. Because of the Israeli <u>economic situation</u>, every war must be very short.

b. <u>Full mobilization</u> creates great difficulties for the nation's economy; therefore from an economic viewpoint, Israel must avoid or reduce this situation as much as possible.

4. Military power is based on economic power, and Israel's military power has been limited as a result of its economic situation.

5. Israel's acquisition of advanced weaponry is limited because of the high prices of those systems.

6. Israel's economic situation limits Israel's ability to develop its own major weapon systems, for example, the Lavi aircraft. In addition, it limits the development of high technology weapons which require large capital investments.

7. The economic gap between Israel and the Arabs increases the threat against Israel. The Arab states invest large sums in high technology arms acquisition, and as a result, they reduce the qualitative gaps in weapon systems.

8. Israel cannot finance another war without outside support.

9. From the economic point of view, every war avoided can be considered a major victory.

The priority of defense considerations in the short term affects economic stability and economic growth in the long term. Therefore, from the Israeli point of view, U.S. foreign aid to Israel should be in the form of investments and not in products. Future military power will be based on research and development, technology, industry, and science. Therefore, Israel must re-examine its economic policy to reduce investment in large, high technology weapons (the Lavi aircraft). Israel must try to avoid war as much as possible. Every war would cause a "steep jump" in defense expenditures, as we can learn from the past.

POLITICAL SITUATION

Israel's political assessment in the national security arena is divided into two major issues--The objectives of war, and the involvement of the superpowers in the conflict. The first

assumption underlying every war between Israel and the Arabs is that the war must be won quickly, clearly and with minimal casualties.[25] The second assumption is that Israel will not allow the Arabs to achieve any territorial gains including return of the occupied territories.[26] This assumption became reality with Israel's "not yielding an inch" policy. The Israeli political and military leadership estimate of the situation was:

1. Only clear victory can establish real deterrence to dis-suade the Arabs from beginning another war. Unfortunately, this principle did not hold true because Israeli victories in the wars of 1956 and 1967 did not deter the Arabs from going to war in 1973. However, Israel's success in 1956 and 1967 did succeed in limiting the operational objectives of the Arabs in the 1973 war. This was demonstrated mainly on the Egyptian front where Sadat pursued only limited territorial gains as the military aim of the war.

2. Arab territorial gains will cause them to initiate other wars in order to achieve territorial gains.

3. The Arabs will negotiate with Israel only when they are convinced that they cannot win by war, and that goals derived from negotiations will be better than those expected from war or the continuation of the existing situation. This point was verified by the Camp David Accords. These peace agreements were a result of Egypt's realization of its inability to defeat Israel in war and by providing a contrast in negotiations significant conces-sions.

4. Israel's international position and support is dependent on worldwide perception of a strong Israel.

5. Without a clear and decisive victory, the fabric of Israel's society will be weakened. A stalemate in war constitutes a failure to Israel and victory for the Arabs.[24]

In regard to involvement of the superpowers in the conflict, Israel's leaders asked the question: How does the superpower involvement in the conflict limit Israel's military and political freedom of action? During the early years it was clear that Israel feared conflict with the superpowers. (The Israeli retreat from Sinai in 1949 and 1956). This threat from the Soviet Union (USSR) existed in the 1967 war and became even stronger in the 1969-1970 War of Attrition and the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Israel's national command authority made it clear that, in every war in the Middle East, there is a threat of intervention by the superpowers in order to prevent a decisive strategic victory.[28] After the 1956 war it was clear that the superpowers were united in the desire to avoid direct military involvement in the conflict and in the desire to avoid decisive victory by either side. Consequently, it was clear to Israel's leaders that it must achieve decisive and quick victory before the superpowers reach agreement and force a cease-fire. From this conclusion came the Israeli concept which says: If the Arabs initiate war, Israel should make every effort to avoid any territorial gains by them, because the time available for military operations is very limited. Eventual superpower intervention to stop the war could result in freezing Arab territorial accomplishments. In addition,

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Israel's leaders understand that the IDF should not threaten either Arab state existence or miliary action against their capitals. On the other hand, superpower intervention could not only be directed against Israeli military successes. This intervention will also come to bear if Israel's existence is in danger, in which case, the United States is expected to help Israel. At the operational level, it was clear that Israel must create "combat fog" in order to delay superpower intervention and to earn vital time to complete its military operational objectives.

The conclusion to be derived from the Israeli perspective is that war results will be dictated, in the end, according to the political situation and not according to the military situation. But the military situation has very large significance in creating the political situation!

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2. Ibid., p. 322.

3. Aharon Yariv, "Strategic Depth" in Marrachot (Hebrew), Vol. 270-271, Tel Aviv, IDF's Official Publishing House, October 1979, p. 27.

4. See maps No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, and 11.

5. Yariv, "Strategic Depth," p. 22.

6. Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel 1988, No. 39, Jerusalem: 1985.

7. Arnon Soffer, "Demography in Eretz-Israel in 1988 and the Year 2000" in Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 51, Jerusalem: The Middle East Institute, Summer 1989, p. 117.

8. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 116, 118.

9. Moshe Sikron, "Demographical tendencies in Israel Population 1948-1984" in <u>Skira Shodshit</u> (Hebrew), No. 3-4, Tel Aviv: IDF's Official Publishing House, April 1984, p. 27.

10. When I use the term "Eretz Israel," I mean all the territory of Israel including Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.

11. Soffer, <u>Demography in Eretz-Israel</u>, pp. 116-120.

12. <u>Ibid</u>.

13. All the population data has been taken from Handel, <u>The Evolution of Israeli Strategy</u>, and CIA, <u>The World Factbook 1989</u>, Washington, DC: CIA, 1989.

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16. Zvi Shor, "Budget Pressure" in <u>Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup</u> (Hebrew), ed. by Offer and Kobber, Tel Aviv: <u>Maarachot</u>, 1985, pp. 205-206.

17. Michael I. Handel, <u>The Evolution of Israel Strategy</u>, p. 20. Eutan Berglas, "Defense and the Economy" in <u>The Israeli Economy</u>, ed. by Yoram Ben Porath, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 173-180.

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19. Joseph Ma'ayan, "The Limits of Power," in <u>Quality and Quantity in Military Buildup</u> (Hebrew), ed. by Offer and Kobber, Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1985, pp. 299-300.

20. Elan Plato, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel - Advantage or Disadvantage" in <u>The Conference at Ministry of Finance</u>, Jerusalem: 1989, pp. 1-2.

21. <u>Ibid</u>, pp. 3-4.

22. Assaf Razin, "U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel" in <u>Jerusalem Quarterly</u>, Jerusalem: Fall 1983, p. 16.

23 Elan Plato, "U.S. Aid to Israel - Advantage or Disadvantage" in <u>The First Conference of the Ministry of Finance 1989</u>, Jerusalem, 1989, p. 1.

24. <u>Ibid</u>.

25. David Ben Gurion, <u>Armed Forces and Security</u>, Tel Aviv:
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of My Life</u> (Hebrew), Jerusalem: Edanim, 1976, pp. 592, 606-607.
Tal, <u>Israel's Doctrine of National Security</u>, p. 7.

26. <u>Ibid</u>.

27. Ariel Levita, <u>Offense and Defense in Israeli Military
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Tel Aviv University, 1988, p. 32.

28. Shimon Peres, <u>Now and Tomorrow</u> (Hebrew), Jerusalem:
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237.

CHAPTER III

THE LEVELS OF ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY

THE STRATEGIC POLITICAL LEVEL

The main consideration facing Israeli political leaders in
the beginning of the 1950s was that Israel's existence was in
danger. The central aim of Arab countries was to destroy the
state of Israel whenever they believed themselves able to do so.
David Ben Gurion said:

> The nature of our security problem is in our
> existence, our existence as a nation and as human
> beings. On us there is a threat, not on our internal
> or external policy but on our basic existence. We
> shall never ignore the basic fact that our enemies'
> threat is to our physical and political existence, and
> this is the stark reality of our security problem.[1]

The second consideration is that Israel cannot base her
security on any foreign influence. Israel is not a member of any
political or military alliance that will guarantee her physical
existence.[2] Nevertheless, Israel has always tried to gain the
support of at least one of the big powers--France and England in
the 1950s and 1960s, and later the United States. At worst,
Israel has attempted to gain the understanding and sympathy of one
or more of the great powers.[3] Superpower support is needed for
Israel to fulfill two main purposes:

1. Military, political, and economic assistance before,
during and after a war.

2. To neutralize and deter another great power that may
intervene on behalf of the Arab side in wartime. Even though
Israel has always placed great importance on cooperation with the
superpowers, this is not considered a sufficient guarantee for the
continued existence of the country.[4]

The third consideration is the fact that Israel will never be
able to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by military means.[5] There
is an asymmetrical difference in the impact of the results of wars
between Israel and the Arab countries. Israel's military,
defeated in a general war, could bring an end to the state. In
contrast, an Israeli decisive victory can never totally destroy an
Arab country.[6] This is because of the political compulsion of the
superpowers, factors derived from the military balance and the
basic conditions in the area.

The fourth consideration is that Israel's security must be
based on the IDF power. The use of the IDF is for strategic
defensive objectives to ensure the maintenance of the "status quo"
(this consideration has been changed in the 1980s).

The fifth consideration is Israel's desire for peace. Israel
will make any effort for peace but since security is more
important, any peace settlement that is perceived to compromise or
undermine Israel's security is unacceptable.[8] It is important to
emphasis that after the 1967 war, the question of what is a
security risk caused discontent among decisionmakers in Israel.
Security settlements which are acceptable to some leaders look
like compromises and a potential threat to the existence of Israel
by others.

The sixth consideration is that Israel will make every effort
to reach the maximum level of military self-sufficiency. This
will be done by developing high technology military industry and
by developing most weapons systems in Israel instead of external
purchase. Israeli society learned during the years to mobilize
its resources effectively for defense needs.

The seventh consideration is that Israel has made it clear
that it desires no conflict with any of the superpowers, but that
it would fight back if directly threatened or attacked by one of
them.[9]

The eighth consideration is that Israel included in its
policy, casi belli--crossing this red line by any aggressive
country may lead to war.[10] Crossing the casi belli does not mean
an automatic war. In each case, an ad hoc decision would be made.

The Israeli red lines were:[11]

a. A concentration of Arab military forces near Israeli
borders, threatening Israel (Six-Day War, 1967).

b. Closing the Tiran Straits or threatening Israel's freedom
of navigation (1956 war and 1967 war).

c. A high level of terrorism or guerrilla activities from
the Arab countries (Sinai War, 1956):

d. Changing the military balance in the region by entering
weapon systems in Arab countries not matched by similar weapon
systems in Israel.

e. Arab attempts to divert the water of the Jordan River.

f. Changing the balance of power by taking control of another country by any country stronger than Lebanon or Jordan. The invasion of Lebanon or Jordan.

The use of casi belli characterized Israel policy until 1967. After the 1979 peace agreement with Egypt, the use of casi belli came back in different versions, but with the same principles.

The ninth consideration is that Israel will not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, but will keep that option open in the event that an Arab country acquires a nuclear weapon.[12]

THE MILITARY STRATEGIC LEVEL

The military strategic level of Israel's national security doctrine is a result of the political activity and the basic issues in the region. The political and military intention *is* *defensive*, but the strategy *is* *offensive*. Israel's lack of strategic depth, the limited national territory, the economic situation, the large number of enemies, the involvement of the superpowers in the region, the need to continually mobilize its reserve forces, sensitivity to casualties and above all the constant feeling of a threat to her existence, caused Israel to adopt a military strategic doctrine that said:

a. Only offensive action, mainly in enemy territory, can bring the war to a decisive end and force the enemy to stop fighting. Consequently, when war breaks out, it must be transferred and fought on enemy territory as soon as possible.[13] Israel's

strategy underlined the fact that it is impossible to achieve strategic objectives by defensive actions because:

1. Israel's lack of strategic depth makes the defense of vital areas at the border impossible.

2. Israel is "few against the many." Because of Arab quantitative superiority, Israel cannot make an effective defense at the strategic level. The theoretical advantage of the tactical level of 3:1 in favor of the attacker is reversed in the strategic level. The attacker is able to launch an offense with superior forces on all fronts simultaneously at many places, in forward and rear areas alike. Given these conditions, the defender is unable to concentrate forces against a specific, dangerous enemy threat. There is no clear and distinct main effort of the enemy, rather, a plethora of threats, any one of which can develop in the course of operations into a dangerous, decisive effort. In the Israeli case, at the tactical level the defense is stronger than the offense, but at the strategic level the offense is stronger than the defense.[14]

3. Defensive battle has a high price in casualties. This is very significant in Israeli society, which is very sensitive to the issue of casualties.

4. The defense is against the IDF's nature and character, which is based on a reserve system that gives it striking power, but limited staying power. In addition, the defense takes away the IDF's advantage relative to the Arabs--in terms of initiative, improvisation and maneuver war.

b.   The basic military advantage of taking the initiative through preemptive attack becomes even more important in the Israeli case.   Consequently Israel adopted the concept of preemptive attack.

c.   The war must be short and decisive and must end with clear victory.[15]

d.   In the question of the aims of the war--military occupation of enemy territory or destruction of the Arab forces-- it was clear that destruction of forces gives only temporary advantage to Israel because of the manpower resources of the Arab world.   On the other hand, military occupation was considered to give a strategic advantage and could be used for bargaining in any negotiations for borders and peace settlements between Israel and the Arabs.[16]

Building the IDF's power is the Israeli answer to the political portion of Israel's national security problem.   The IDF was based on:[17]

a.   A small element of standing army (career soldiers) whose purpose was to train the active army and to man the services and technical branches, mainly the air force and intelligence.

b.   Compulsory service of every man and woman (men serve for three years and women for two years).

c.   Reserve units very well organized and trained based on a regular mobilization system, and constitute the main body of the IDF--the decisive force of the IDF.   Reserve duty in Israel is required of every man until the age of 55.   Each reserve soldier serves 30-45 days a year on active duty or in training.

d. Peripheral defense--a solution to Israel's lack of strategic depth. Peripheral defense was based on the establishment of paramilitary and fortified civilian border settlements designed to provide the first line of defense. Every settlement is a tactical forward outpost.

At the political level, Israel does not have any interest in initiating war. Israel will only react to war that is forced on it. Consequently, military strategy says that if the enemy initiates war against Israel, the active army or the reserve units on active duty and the "peripheral defense" forces, will hold the enemy and cover the mobilization of the reserve forces. Once the reserve forces have mobilized, Israel's army will attack and decisively end the war. Since Israel's decisive power is mainly based on the reserve, it must have time to mobilize, organize and deploy. The first, and most important, precondition is warning time available. This is the reason why warning time is so important in Israel's strategy. As a result, significant resources were invested in the building of a modern and technologically advanced intelligence system in the active force. Its main objective is to give early warning of any surprise attack. Since Israel's military strategy was focused on decisive war, the air force and the armored forces became the most important part of the IDF. The Israeli Air Force (IAF) was built from the best quality manpower available in Israel. Large amounts of capital were invested in the buildup of the IAF power in order to achieve air supremacy and to guarantee Israel's air space. The armor and the elite infantry were built to achieve armored power with striking

power and the decisive edge in a war. Israel's strategy determined that the IDF must be built and developed according to the assumption that it would have to face a combined and coordinated military effort by several, if not all, the Arab armies at the same time. The IDF must always take the worst case analysis, the strongest threat possible against Israel. In case of war on more than one front, the strongest opponent "must be taken care of first."[18] Israel must attack the strongest enemy first and defend on the other fronts. After defeating the strongest enemy, Israel must then attack and win in all the other fronts.

THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The theater is characterized by a change from the "personal weapons era" to the "collective weapons era." In 1948, the War of Independence, the personal sidearm was the main weapon and the crew served weapon was in a supporting role. In 1956, during the Sinai campaign, the crew served weapon took the place of the personal weapon as the decisive weapon. In the operation level the IDF changed its nature from an infantry army to an armored and mobile army with striking power, decisive ability, and absolute priority to quick battle movement. The IDF changed its outlook and built a large army with clear priority for armored units, mechanized units and elite forces (airborne, commandos). The basis of the armor forces was the tank, the most important part of the force. All other forces are designed in order to support the tank by infantry support, protection, security, breaching obstacles, fire cover and maintenance.[19] In the air component,

the operational level is based on quality air power to guarantee air superiority and a quick, decisive combat edge. The air force is the long range strategic and operational level branch which can strike strategic targets and forces throughout the Arab world. It can also target in the area of operations on the tactical battle-field. In the naval component, the operational level is based on a quality navy whose mission is to protect the nation's coasts. The navy also projects an offensive ability in order to achieve navael supremacy based on technological advantage. (The Israel navy was never the main part of the IDF.)

In order to achieve the strategic objective, significant changes occurred in the IDF's doctrine and organization.[20] These are:

1. Transition from battalions to brigades and armor divisions as the basic formation.

2. Developing joint and combined doctrine based on offensive doctrine. Decisive offensive assaults (rather than by attrition) with close air support, deep penetration to enemy territory and keeping the momentum of the attack.

3. The IDF changed its basic system of training and developed a combine arms, staff procedures, and intensive officer training system of a modern army.

In order to achieve the military strategic objectives of quick, decisive war and clear victory, the Israeli doctrine at the operational level requires that the IDF use surprise, maneuver, and concentration of troops and power in order to break the enemy's will to fight. Those aims will be achieved by deception,

philosophy of the indirect approach and minimization of casualties. The doctrine emphasizes the principle of concentration of combat power at the decisive point. This creates for the Israelis local supremacy at the tactical level despite the quantitative inferiority at the strategic level.

The IDF emphasizes its maximum use of "firepower." Because of Israel's inferiority in manpower, it was necessary to find an alternative. The answer was the use of devastating firepower superiority, primarily based on the IAF. At the operational level there was special focus on the high degree of freedom of action given to the commanders in the field. Within the limits of the primary mission that was given to the commanders in the field, they also have a large zone of action, full flexibility, and can take the initiative and improvise as long as they accomplish the objectives assigned to them. The norm that was created was accomplishment of the objective and not accomplishment of the plan. In order to achieve this perception, the quality of the commanders at the field level was the most important part in implementing the doctrine.

Israel's solution to the problem of quantitative inferiority, relative to the power of its potential enemies, is through matching its quality against the enemy's quantity. At the operational level the principle of quality is realized in many areas. In the military field it is applied first and foremost through fostering an offensive spirit. In this form of combat, Israel's qualitative advantage may best be exploited. Israel's offensive doctrine tries to foster motivation, initiative, flexibility,

improvisation, bravery, detailed military planning, indirect
approach, and deception.

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CHAPTER IV

THE PERMANENT AND THE VARIABLE
IN ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

THE CURRENT THREAT

When examining the issues, the most important factor influencing all levels of Israel's national security policy is the "extant threat" from the Arabs against Israel. Israel feels itself as a distressed nation that struggles for its existence in a hostile strategic environment. The threat is fundamental and real, and the confict itself is continual.[1] Security of the nation is the main aim of Israeli strategy and diplomacy. It is fixed in the Israeli outlook that Israel is always in a "sleepy war" even when there is no "shooting war."[2]

The tension between Israel and the Arabs did not stop after the cease-fire agreements in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 (except for Egypt after 1973). The Israeli experience from all the Arab-Israeli wars and the continual psychological pressure of war always imminent, made Israel adopt the "worst case analysis" that, in turn, caused feelings of insecurity through the years. From 1948 until today the Arabs have developed from small armies of battalions and brigades with small air forces and navies into large, modern military forces. During these years, mainly after every war, the Arabs increased their military power (see Table 5). This strengthening was not based only on quantity, but also on the following qualitative improvements:

a. The best Eastern weapons systems and current generation technology became the basis of the Arab armed forces armament. (Some military analysis believe that Eastern technology and weapons systems are not equal to those from the West.)

b. Transformation to armored and mechanized armies with a larger capability in offensive operations. These forces pose a real threat to Israel.

c. Recruiting more educated and qualified troops for their armed forces. This phenomenon was emphasized in the Egyptian army before the 1973 war and has occurred in all the Arab armies.

d. Increasing the total resources and capital invested in the Arab armies.

e. Long range surface-to-surface missiles were introduced to the region by the Arab armies.

Between 1948 and the 1979 Egypt-Israeli peace agreement, the existing threat was a permanent element in Israel's natural security policy. The assumption was that Israel was in "constant danger." As a result, ensuring Israel's military ability to defend itself was more important than resolving the overall conflict. Every strike against Israel's security raised concern about the question of the existence of the nation. Consequently, peace was greatly desired, but security remained more important.

In the last decade the threat against Israel has decreased rapidly. The dangers of war between the Arabs and Israel is less less likely than it was between 1948 and 1979. Camp David and the resulting peace agreements eliminated Egypt, the most important Arab country, from the cycle of war. Jordan, with nothing to

gain, is practically outside of the "war cycle"; Lebanon as a nation is not a threat to Israel; and the conflict between Iran and Iraq has diminished the threat from the latter. All of the above factors, therefore, have essentially reduced the threat against Israel. The most serious military threat against Israel today comes from Syria. However, it is not a threat to the very existence of the state of Israel. In objective terms Israel's strategic condition has greatly improved in the last decade. In contrast, in its psychological situation, which is very important in the Israeli case, real improvement did not occur. The people of Israel continue to think that <u>nothing has changed. The per-</u> <u>ceived threat continues to be dominant in the psychological com-</u> <u>plexion of the nation</u>.

Although the threat is decreasing, there are three strategic situations within the Middle East that cause the threat to be present and real:

a. The buildup of Syrian military power as a result of the 1982 "peace for the Galilee Operation" and the Syrian quest for strategic balance with Israel.

b. The strengthening of the Iraqi armed forces as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. Today Iraq's armed forces number one million men with 55 divisions, 5,500 tanks, 513 combat aircraft, and large numbers of missiles.[3] Iraqi armed forces have consid-erable combat experience, chemical weapons and long range surface-to-surface missiles. In addition, Iraq has developed a large military industry and has created a new military relationship with China.

c. The end of Iran-Iraq war increased the dangerous possibility that Iraqi forces could deploy to develop an "Eastern Front" against Israel.

Notwithstanding the above situations, current changes around the globe will decrease the chances of war in the Middle East and increase the chances of political solutions between Israel and the Arab world.   These changes are:

a. The events in East Europe, the new relationship between East and West, and the Soviet desire to avoid regional conflicts.

b. The difficulties in the Syrian economic situation and that nation's deep involvement in Lebanon.

c. The decrease of "oil power" in the world and as a direct result, a reduction in the resources available for military needs in the Arab world.

d. The conflicts inside the Arab world among Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Iran, and their different interests and policies.

e. The influence of Egypt on the Arab world and its desire to be a catalyst for the political initiatives in the Middle East. Also Egypt's desire to be freed from the stigma of being the only Arab country that has made peace with Israel.

THE PEACE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT

Over 30 years, Egypt had been the biggest and most important of all Israel's neighbors, with the most powerful armed force in any Arab coalition against Israel.   Egypt was the only country fighting Israel in five different wars (1948-1949, The War of Independence; 1956, the Sinai Campaign; 1967, the Six Day War;

1969-1970, the War of Attrition; and 1973, the Yom Kippur War).
The rapprochement process between Israel and Egypt after the 1973
war came to its peak in the peace agreement in 1979, and has
significantly changed Israel's strategic situation in the 1980's.
The peace agreement has two layers--The military provisions and
the bilateral, political relationship. The military part of the
peace agreement has demilitarized most of the Sinai and prevented
its occupation by Egyptian armed forces, has given Israel's ships
(including warships) full freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal,
and ensured the free flow of oil to Israel. The military part is
the most stabilizing and powerful part of the peace agreement and
has been responsible for the following achievements:

a. Egypt left the Arab cycle of war. As a result, the
chance of overall Arab war against Israel has been reduced.

b. The border between Israel and Egypt has turned into a
peaceful one. In the last decade, no Israeli soldier has been
killed or injured along this border. Peace has characterized this
border from the day the IDF left Sinai on April 25, 1982.

c. The Sinai has turned into a warning zone instead of a
combat zone for the IDF.

d. With a peaceful border on the south, the IDF could take
risks to reduce its defense budget and reduce its active duty
combat manpower.

e. Israel now has more strategic freedom of action in the
region since Egypt does not have any strategic or political
reasons to go to war against Israel. Because of its size and

influence, the other Arab countries will find it difficult to go to war without Egypt.

The political part of the peace agreement, which is called "normalization" in contrast to the military portion was never important and vital to the Egyptians. Therefore, the "daily peace" in the last decade is a "cold peace," showing the ups and downs in the political relationship between Egypt and Israel. The events of the first few years after the peace agreement showed the Arab world and Egypt, that Israel has taken advantage of the separate peace agreement with Egypt.[4] The Jerusalem law of July 1980; bombing of the atomic reactor in Iraq, 1981; annexation of the Golan Heights, 1981; dismissal of the Arab city mayors in the West Bank, March 1982; Israel's settlements on the West Bank during the entire period; and, above all, the tragedy of the Lebanon war. Throughout all these events and mainly the 1982 war, the peace agreement with Egypt passed the test and Egypt did not join the remainder of the Arab world fighting against Israel. The Egyptian leadership understood that the peace agreement was a vital element in solving the basic domestic problems of their country.

The peace with Egypt is the most important of Israel's successes. It gave Israel, for the first time, the status of a recognized player in the diplomatic arena of the Middle East. The peace agreement with Egypt changed the importance of the diplomatic component as opposed to the military component. For the first time we can see the increasing importance of the diplomatic component in Israeli policy. This agreement reduced the chances

for war in the Middle East. From the Israeli point of view, it changed completely, the danger of war on two fronts. The main military threat against Israel today is the "Eastern Front" where Syria is the leading threat.

DETERRENCE

From the character of Israel's political aims and economic, social and military considerations, comes the conclusion that Israel has no desire to initiate war against the Arabs (exclude the 1982 war). Consequently, at the strategic level, the first mission of the IDF is to deter the Arabs. If deterrence fails, the IDF must decisively defeat its enemies on the battlefield and must keep them from achieving their military objectives. First, is the recognition that deterrence is a temporary solution and that without agreement between both sides, it will fail sooner or later.[5] The existing state of mutual deterrence between the superpowers in the nuclear era is based on the ability and will to use nuclear weapons, and does not exist at the conventional level. Deterrence at the conventional level is fundamentally limited and works nowhere.[6] In the Israeli case, the limited nature of deterrence became even more evident because of the characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These characteristics were:[7]

a. The total animosity in the Arab world towards Israel.

b. The quantitative ratio of power in which the Arabs always have a significant advantage.

c. The escalating arms race in the region.

d. The involvement of the superpowers in the region.

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Over the years, the threat of military punishment became the main component of Israel's deterrence policy, but it achieved only limited success. During the 1960's Israel publicly defined her _casi belli_ which, if crossed by the Arabs, could lead to war. Crossing these casi belli by Egypt in May 1967, by deploying Egyptian forces into Sinai, led to the 1967 Six Day War.[8] In 1968 President Nasser initiated military actions which led to the War of Attrition, despite Israel's absolute superiority in the 1967 Six-Day War. In 1973 Egypt again initiated war against Israel in spite of the Israeli deterrence policy. The lesson to learn from this is that deterrence at the conventional level is not effective when the objectives of the war are to achieve political aims, even at the price of military failure.

Israel's casi belli were redefined at the beginning of the 1980s by Ariel Sharon when he was Minister of Defense. The new casi belli that Israel will not accept were:[9]

a. Syrian forces south of the Litani River.

b. Deployment of the Egyptian army into the Sinai after the peace agreement.

c. The establishment of an air defense network along the Jordan River that will limit Israel's freedom of maneuver in the air.

Crossing these casi belli, according to Sharon, would not lead to an automatic reaction. Rather, in each case, an _ad hoc_ decision would be reached based on Israel's best interests at the time.

Israel's policy of deterrence has always been based on the assumption that clear and visible Israeli victory in any military

conflict with the Arabs will cause the Arabs to conclude that a military option is not possible. However, the history of Israeli warfare shows that victory, no matter how big, cannot deter over the long range.

Israel's concept of deterrence has remained a permanent part of its national security policy over the years. Israel believes in deterrence through prevention--to avoid any military victories by the Arabs primarily in the territorial acquisition and deterrence through punishment--military defeat of the Arab countries. In both terms Israel has achieved only partial success.

NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCEPT

It can be said that, until the 1967 Six-Day War, national consensus with the government policy characterized Israel's security concept. After 1967, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza strip, and Golan Heights decreased the threat against Israel. Occupation of those territories by Israel has caused a mixing of political and ideological considerations in Israel's security thinking. This caused an end to the national consensus in security issues. The disagreement is primarily over three basic elements: The size, location, and position of the territory needed to ensure the ability of Israel to defend itself from an attack from the East.[10]

On one side there is the "maximum territorial position" that says Israel must militarily and politically control all the West Bank and Gaza Strip (according to Israel, the Golan Heights are part of the State by annexation of the Golan Heights on

December 1981) and give autonomy to the population. On the other side, there is another approach of "territorial compromise," meaning a new distribution of "Eratz" Israel with "defensible borders" by Israeli definition. An example of this compromise is the <u>Alon Plan</u>.[11] The strategic design of this plan is to have Israel control all the approaches to the West Bank by annexing the Jordan Valley, with the West Bank becoming a buffer zone. In terms of security needs, without relation to ideology, there is national consensus in Israel that any political settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will include:

a.   Preventing the stationing of armor forces, artillery and ground-to-air missiles in those areas.

b.   Stationing of Israeli armed forces to guarantee delaying enemy forces from the East until Israel can mobilize its reserve and establish a defensive line.

c.   Preventing any military threat from those areas against Israel.

The national consensus on the defense issue was largely influenced by internal political developments. When the Likud Party came to power in 1977, after 29 years of power by the Labor Party, the national disagreement over the defense issue was intensified. The political platform of the Likud Party is different from that of the Labor Party, primarily in the issue of Eratz Israel and its borders.

The 1982 "Operation Peace for Galilee" created among the Israeli public, strong and sharp debate on the justification and need for the war. The war was considered as a "war of choice,"

designed to achieve political aims far beyond the "Peace for Galilee" aim and the objective of eliminating the PLO in Lebanon. This was the first time the public expressed its view <u>during the war</u>. The involvement of the public in the debate over war and defense issues had always existed, but it was always unanimous in supporting the government. In the 1982 Lebanon War, however, the Israeli society was divided and a lot of people opposed the government policy. Questions of security and war, which were previously in the hands of a very small group of people, were being debated openly in public. The public is now deeply involved in defense issues, and thus will have a significant impact on the management of war in the future, especially in a preemptive, or war by choice. The question of the borders and the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip has polarized Israeli society more than any other issue during the last 23 years.

The fixing of the borders is the main question in the relationship between the Jewish community and the Arabs. The Israeli society, when it looks for solutions, finds itself divided in its opinions about this question.[12] The unique situation of Israel normally causes feelings of solidarity in Israel's society. However, today there is national disagreement about the national aims and objectives concerning borders.

THE DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S. AND THE STATUS QUO POLICY

During the 1950s and 1960s Israel succeeded in strengthening military power better than the Arab countries. The War of Attrition, 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the oil crisis following the

latter war did not enable Israel to compete in the arms race without increasing its allocation of resources for defense needs, thereby increasing its dependence on foreign aid. The arms race created Israeli dependence on the U.S. for two main reasons:

a. The U.S. was the only source for modern, high technology weapons for Israel.

b. Israel had to finance the arms acquisitions with massive U.S. aid.

The Israeli dependence on the U.S. is not based solely on military considerations. The international isolation of Israel in the political arena caused this political and diplomatic dependence. This dependence has increased in the last seventeen years primarily as a result of:

1. The diplomatic relations between Israel and large numbers of countries in the Third World.

2. The downfall of friendly regions on the periphery of the Middle East, i.e., Iran and Ethiopia.

3. The increasing importance of the Arab world to Europe as a result of Europe's need for Arab oil.
These military and political considerations cause Israel to see the U.S. as its only real ally. Consequently, Israel has lost much political freedom of action.

The asymmetric situation of the conflict in which Israel does not have decisive power at the strategic level and in which, as a result, Israel has difficulties translating military achievements into political gains (this situation will probably increase in the future), caused Israel to adopt a defensive "status quo strategy"

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at the political level. This approach had been constant and characterized Israel's strategy until 1981. A change in this approach occurred in Israel when Arik Sharon became Minister of Defense. There would be no more status quo strategy. Israel would go to war in order to achieve political aims--throwing the Syrians out of Lebanon, expelling the PLO from Lebanon, and creating new regimes convenient and comfortable for Israel that would sign peace agreements. These aims may have been unrealistic and beyond Israel's reach.

The primary operational change in Israel's strategy during this time concerns the conditions under which Israel would go to war. The strategy used until 1981 said that Israel would opt for war only when it was threatened or weak. The new strategy said that Israel will use the military option when its military power is at a maximum level and the conditions in the region are ideal. Thus Israel will take advantage of the opportunity and establish new potential situations by military power. Some of Arik Sharon's military objectives could not be achieved in the Lebanon War because the conditions were not ideal. No one can take power in Lebanon except by military power, neither Arik Sharon nor the Syrians, despite their attempts during the past fourteen years. We must understand that military power is limited, and there are some aims that cannot be achieved by military power, especially in the Israeli case.

When Moshe Arens became Minister of Defense, Israel returned to the old approach of a "status quo" policy at the political level in which Israel would go to war only when the issue is vital

to the security of the nation. Today, without any doubt, Israel's strategy at the political level is a defensive strategy, namely a status quo policy. Every war avoided is another victory for Israel.

GEOGRAPHICAL DEPTH, SHIFTING THE WAR AND "DEFENSIBLE BORDERS"

Israel's lack of strategic depth until 1967 created two basic problems. The first was the problem of a limited operational maneuver area--any tactical retreat could develop into strategic disaster. The second is the problem of relative power compared with time (mobilizing the reserve). Consequently, as explained earlier, the first principle of Israeli strategic military doctrine was transferring the war to the opposing force's territory as soon as possible.

The territorial changes in the region as a result of the 1967 Six-Day War gave Israel, for the first time, some strategic depth. Those territorial acquisitions have changed the Israeli doctrine of "preemptive strike" which was considered important, but not vital.[13] This new perception of the territorial component was called secure borders and later "defensible borders."[14] This perception released Israel from the political compulsion to open a war and to be seen as an aggressor in the international arena.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli war brought to light the strategic limits of the "defensible borders" in guaranteeing the ability to absorb an initial attack against Israel. On the other hand, this war had also shown that this strategy did have some advantages. The war was conducted in areas that Israel had occupied in the

1967 Six-Day War, and did not risk the existence of the State. In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Arabs wanted, first of all, to change the political status quo in the region, and they were ready to be satisfied with limited territorial achievement. Consequently, the strategic and operational objectives of the Egyptians were very limited; to cross the canal with large infantry formations abundantly equipped with antitank missiles and advance to a line within the surface-to-air missile umbrella. In 1973, Israel did not have the advantage of fighting short interior lines and did not operationally use the strategic depth that was created in 1967. Israel in the beginning of the war used static defense--the IDF tried to deny the Egyptians any territorial gain.[15] On the northern front in the Golan Heights, the static defense--with the depth which Israel achieved in 1967--was very successful. The Syrian army lost as many as 800 tanks, and the first Syrian strike did not reach Israel's settlements in Hashula and Jordan Valley.[16] After the 1973 War a new concept was added to the territorial component of the Israeli strategy--demilitarization of buffer zones. The peace agreement with Egypt is based on this strategy.

Changing from the concept of strategic depth to one of warning zones defended by small forces made the evacuation of the IDF from Sinai possible. As a result, very important political advantages have been created--reduction of the tension and friction between both countries. The peace agreement gave Israel the very important military advantage of short lines of communications. On the other hand, it created disadvantages by requiring a new casi belli in the Sinai at the political level, reduction in

aerial freedom of action, and the loss of forward Israeli bases in Sinai, primarily Sharm-esh-Sheikh at the military level.

On the Syrian front, the Golan Heights is not like Sinai. The operational depth of Sinai does not exist in the Golan Heights. Consequently, any agreement must be different on this front. Complete Israeli retreat from the Golan Heights is considered as a high risk to the very existence of the country.

Today, the main discussion about strategic depth and defensible borders is focused on the area between the Jordan River and the green line (the 1949 cease-fire between Israel and Jordan). This area is the "soft belly" of Israel. The West Bank is strategic mountainous terrain overlooking Israel's coastal plain, where two-thirds of the Jewish population lives and where the main infrastructure is located.

PREVENTIVE WAR AND PREEMPTIVE ATTACK

In the principle of preventive war and preemptive attack, significant changes have occurred in the last forty-two years. Between 1948 and 1955 Israel's military doctrine did not adopt the principle of initiating a war because the IDF's capability and the political circumstances did not make it possible. The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was the first war in which Israel initiated a strike as a result of the circumstances and a specific plan. The impressive Israeli victory in 1956 and the Arab build-up after the war caused Israel to adopt the principle of preemptive attack. Israeli military doctrine determined that in any case of real threat against Israel, the IDF will launch a preemptive attack.[17]

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Despite the significance of the concept of preemptive attack, this principle was not of prime importance in Israel's military doctrine as illustrated by three main events between 1960-1973.

1. A 1960 "Rotem Operation" occurred when the Egyptians deployed forces to Sinai and surprised Israel.[18] Israel did not launch a preemptive attack because of U.S. arbitration and because the small Egyptian forces in Sinai were far away from the Israeli borders.

2. The deployment of greater numbers of Egyptian armed forces to the Sinai in 1967 did not immediately cause a preemptive attack. Very significant diplomatic efforts were undertaken to cause the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Sinai and to open the Straits of Tiran for the navigation of Israeli ships. The decision to go to war was determined in Israel only when all the diplomatic efforts had failed and war was the only solution left.[19]

3. On the morning of 6 October 1973, the chief of the Israeli General Staff ordered the Israeli Air Force to be ready for preemptive air attack against Egypt and Syria. The proposal of the IDF commander, for air attack, was rejected by the Israeli government for political reasons.

In the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" operations, the Israeli government changed its view towards the issue of preventive war. Prime Minister Menachem Begin defined preventive war as justifiable when it serves political and military objectives.[20] Minister of Defense Arial Sharon in the same time period justified preventive war in order to achieve political aims--solving the

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Arab-Israeli conflict or part of it.[21] After the 1982 war there were several significant changes in the region: (1) the military strengthening of Syria, (2) the increasing threat of surface-to-surface missiles, (3) the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and (4) the increasing chances of establishing an Arab Eastern Front against Israel. These changes raised more and more voices supporting an Israeli preemptive attack. There is no evidence today that Israel has accepted the principle of preemptive attack. However, it is clear that the military leadership will always aspire to preemptive attack and we must expect that the military leadership will press the political leaders on this issue.

The question of preventive war and preemptive attack is basically a political question despite all the military advantages inherent in it. The reduction in Israel's political freedom of action because of Israel's increasing dependence on the U.S. will reduce the chances of political consent to preventive war and preemptive attack without the prior support of the U.S.

The use of preemptive attack is always problematical from the political point of view, in the Israeli case, because of its international political implications. The political risk in being the aggressor and initiating an preemptive attack against Arab countries is not based only on what the U.S. will say, but it is also based on the reaction of other countries, especially Egypt and the USSR. The USSR will probably not be able to accept an Israeli preemptive attack against Syria. More seriously, such an attack can put an end to the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, bringing Egypt back into the cycle of war.

Another consideration for the use of preemptive attack is
that the Israeli public, before it gives support to the govern-
ment, will want to be assured that any preemptive attack initiated
by Israel is the result of the existence of a direct threat
against Israel or an expected attack initiated by the Arabs.
Ignoring the needs of national consensus can lower the motivation
of some soldiers to fight.

An additional consideration is what military benefits the
preemptive attack would give to Israel. The lessons learned by
the Arabs from the IDF victories in the past, especially in an
aerial preemptive attack, will make it more difficult for the IDF
to achieve the same decisive victory in the future. The Arab
efforts in air defense will limit the IDF's freedom of action in
the air. The large Syrian investments in preparing defenses in
the Golan Heights, including fortifications with obstacles and
antitank forces in great numbers will make it difficult for the
IDF to achieve easy victories in time of war. One should not
conclude that the advantage of preemptive attack no longer exists,
but without any doubt the advantage has been reduced relative to
the past.

Despite the relative reduction in the significance of the
preemptive attack, it is still important because it can complicate
the enemy's preparation for war. It may result in the greater
occupation of key areas at relatively low cost and can become an
important psychological element that will disrupt the enemy's
functioning.

Israel should use a preemptive attack only after exhausting all political possibilities and only after the government is absolutely sure that the Arabs are going to attack. There must be coordination and understanding from the U.S. in order to reduce, as much as possible, the political, economic, and military cost of the preemptive attack.

QUALITY AND QUANTITY

The population disparity between Israel and the Arabs obliges the former to look for quality solutions. The qualitative solution to the quantitative problem has been a constant element from 1948 until today, but the emphasis has changed during this period. Israel bases it military power on the following qualitative solutions:

1. The ability to mobilize its manpower. After the 1973 war, 40,000 former reservists came back to the reserve army and thousands of soldiers were shifted from the service units to the combat units. In addition, great efforts to bring new manpower to the regular army have been made.

2. The ability to mobilize capital resources.

3. High technological and scientific levels.

4. High proficiency and skill levels.

5. Organizational effectiveness and operational flexibility on the battlefield.

Israel greatly desired to achieve qualitative advantages in all corps and branches. Air superiority is one of the main examples of the Israeli efforts to balance power in the region

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through better technological weapon systems and the qualitative superiority of the Israeli pilots and ground crews. Israel's training systems and the preparation of pilots for war are unique. As a result, the quality of the pilots is very high. In the naval arena, the Israeli planners gave considerable thought and study to Israel's maritime problems and managed to concentrate the maximum firepower feasible in a small vessel. The Israeli missile boat proved to be far superior in firepower to any conventional destroyer. In the 1973 naval war, not a single Israeli vessel was sunk. This is despite the fact that the Egyptian and Syrian navies fired a total of seventy missiles at Israeli targets at sea and sustained a confirmed loss of nineteen naval vessels, including ten missile boats.[22]

In the Israeli armored corps, shooting accuracy has been increased and efforts were focused on survival and mobility as a solution to the quantitative problem. A solution to the quantitative problem of artillery is the mobility of Israeli artillery on the ground. Special efforts at improving older weapon systems and building new weapon systems suitable to the Middle East theater have been made by the Israel military industry and ordnance corps. This is another example of compensation for quantitative inferiority with high technology. During all the years, the IDF focused on the quality of area power as the first priority to solve the quantity problem. The main solutions were:

1. Operational flexibility that makes economy of force possible with the assistance of deception, misleading, and disinformation. Flexible operations are economical because they do not

require, in advance, large allocations of forces to meet the large number of possible situations on the battlefield.

2. Great attention is paid to the middle and lower levels of commanders in the field. The IDF has focused on modern and unique methods of field training as a qualitative multiplier.

3. Flexible systems of command, control and communication, which are less vulnerable to friction and changes on the modern battlefield.

4. Accomplishment of the mission. The achievement of the objective is more important than the following of the plan. All plans are the basis for changes.

5. Giving great authority to lower levels of field commanders without the need for confirmation from the higher level on every local action.

Parallel to the improvements and qualitative solutions that happened in the IDF over the years, and as a lesson learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the IDF focused on quantitative military buildup. From 1974 until 1977, the IDF doubled its power.[23]

1. The quantity of the tanks increased by 50 percent and the tank fleet became more effective.

2. Field artillery increased by 100 percent and saw qualitative improvement in its mobility.

3. Armored personnel carriers increased by 80 percent.

4. Combat aircraft increased by 30 percent and the first line aircraft were upgraded to the best possible in Western technology.

Until 1967, the IDF was focused on personnel quality as a power multiplier. After 1967 the scope of the technological solutions compared with human solutions became more dominant. After 1973 it was clear that qualitative solutions to the quantity problems were not enough. Consequently, the IDF increased its size and power.

All in all, it can be seen that qualitative solutions to quantitative problems have been constant elements of Israel national security policy, but the emphasis has changed. Israel must constantly emphasize the human element. Military technology can be bought. For all new technological advances there will be counter-solutions, it is only a question of time. On the other side, the human element will be the one that will bring victory in wars. Consequently, the IDF must be focused on the human element. It would be a very big mistake to underestimate the importance of the technology element, but the human element is still more important.

ENDNOTES

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5. Levita, *Offensive and Defensive*, p. 104.

6. Shimschoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*.

7. Yariv, _Thirty Years of Security_, p. 11.

8. Levita, _Offense and Defense_, p. 40.

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23. Rabin, _The Rabin Memories_, p. 505.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Israel is the only nation in the world that has fought six wars in the last forty-two years. Since the War of Independence, Israel has successfully avoided a direct threat to the existence of the nation. Above all, Israel has avoided a dangerous and hard blow to the State. Israel has proved its ability at self-defense and made it clear to the Arab world and the rest of the world that the Arab countries cannot defeat her. The IDF's power caused a slow process of recognition in Israel's right to exist by the Arabs. In spite of the large number of wars, Israel succeeded in establishing a modern democracy, to grow economically, to develop a modern country, and to allow its citizens to lead a normal life.

In spite of the special position of the IDF, there has never been a doubt in the authority of civilian elected leaders over the military. Israel has remained a democracy, in contrast to a large number of countries in the world. The IDF victories guaranteed the existence of Israel but did not bring significant political achievements that could totally change Israel's strategic condition--except the peace with Egypt.

Israel's national security policy relied on military power and was dominated by the IDF. It is necessary that the policy should look more for peaceful rather than military solutions. However, Israel should never ignore the danger of another war and must be ready for it. The first and central aim of Israeli

strategy is to guarantee the IDF power. The key to the existence of Israel and its ability to manage a policy for peace with the Arabs, relies on Israel's military powers.

The peace agreement with Egypt caused a significant reduction in the dangers to the security of Israel. As a result, there was an opportunity to reexamine the strategy and to increase the importance of the political element relative to the military. However, military power and its use is still the main element in Israel's strategy, instead of using the military power as an element to achieve a political solution to Israel's security problems. The main change that must occur in Israeli strategy is establishing more balance between the political and military elements in Israel's national security policy. Until now, Israel has been very successful in obtaining military, economic and political foreign support. This aid made Israel increasingly dependent on the U.S. and, as a result, Israel has gradually lost her strategic freedom of action. Because Israel has not been able to make peace with most Arab countries, it must continue to maintain military power at very high economic, social, and political costs. The maintenance of military power has made Israel increasingly dependent on the U.S. on the one hand and, on the other hand, has not enabled Israel to develop economically and socially in the same way as other modern Western societies. The increasing power of the Arab world and primarily the "oil weapon" have politically isolated Israel. Consequently, Israel must invest more and more resources in security in spite of her other economic and social needs. Those investments in security create economic

difficulties for Israel and decease the chances of real economical development that had characterized Israel's economy until 1970.

During all the years from the establishment of the nation, Israel's military doctrine was offensive at the military strategic and operational level when the political intention was a defensive "status quo state." This doctrine provided the nation the ability to gain considerable economic and social achievements. The political and military changes that have occurred in the Middle East and in the global arena (as previously explained) must cause a change in Israeli doctrine. The main change that must occur is to establish more or a balance between the offensive and defensive in Israeli military doctrine. This means there must be significant increases in the defensive element of the military doctrine. Establishing more balance to the doctrine will strengthen the IDF conventional deterrence capability, improve the IDF fighting ability, cause better utilization of modern weapon systems, and above all, increase Israeli's political freedom of action. This is not to say that Israel must give up the offensive part of the doctrine. This part is very important and gives Israel great advantages. Parallel to the offensive part, Israel must improve the defensive part of the doctrine. Lately a new approach to defensive doctrine is evolving, primarily on the Syrian front, on the Golan Heights.

The main change that must occur in Israeli military doctrine is to adopt a defensive military strategy that would be parallel to the Israeli policy of deterrence of war and maintenance of the "status quo." When a nation selects its political and military

doctrine, it has four basic possibilities (see Table 8). Israel must move from Square No. 2 to Square No. 4.

FOUR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES

POLITICAL STRATEGY

	OFFENSE	DEFENSE
OFFENSE **MILITARY STRATEGY**	1. OFFENSIVE OFFENSIVE	2. DEFENSIVE OFFENSIVE
DEFENSE	3. OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE	4. DEFENSIVE DEFENSIVE

The reason for this change is based on the current political difficulties that exist when Israel becomes the initiator of war. Those difficulties are mainly external, but they have some internal implications.

The IDF is not prepared to shift the war to enemy territory without reserve forces. Once reserve forces are mobilized, the IDF can shift the war. However, the force ratios in the age of technology are so bad that it would be better to let the enemy be shattered on the IDF defensive positions and only after that, go on to counterattack.

CONCLUSIONS

. Israel has been successfully defending herself against major Arab threats despite all its basic geographic, demographic and economic weaknesses.

. Israel's demographic, geographic, and economic problems and weaknesses cause Israel to base her strategy on qualitative solutions: (1) technology as a force multiplier, (2) mobilization of the nation, (3) a very successful reserve system with highly trained and motivated personnel, (4) great freedom of action for the commanders in the field, (5) maximum quality of middle and lower echelons of commanders, and (6) offensive doctrine and planning that gives initiative, flexibility, improvisation, indirect approach, and deception to the military leadership.

. The demographic changes in Israel now and in the next century may cause identity problems within Israel and internally cause separation and establishment of two states. Consequently,

Israel must have a clear vision and make a decision about the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The strategy of delaying a decision, _not to decide_, must change. Israel must reach a decision about the West Bank and Gaza. (Decisions on the issue are clearly political decisions and they are beyond the scope of this paper.)

. Israel must change the domination of the military element of power on its strategy and national security policy. In the future, Israel must base its strategy on nonmilitary solutions to the conflict. Israel must turn to solutions for negotiations and diplomacy for peace. Israel has learned during the years that it is impossible to achieve political aims mainly through the use of military power.

. Israel's desire for absolute security and always estimating the worst case analysis must be changed to _taking risks for peace_ and negotiations. A positive example is the result of the peace between Israel and Egypt.

. The new world order and the revolution in East Europe make Israel feel very concerned about how the world views it as a democratic and peaceful country. The superpowers, Western world public opinion, and even world Jewry will not accept the situation in which Israel looks like a country that uses military power to prevent Palestinian self determination and freedom. Israel must understand the increasing importance of the world's mass media, propaganda and world public opinion, especially in the U.S. Israel must invest much more effort to inform the world and explain the unique situation of Israel.

. From political, social and economical considerations, every war avoided is a victory for Israel. Every war that is not avoided will cause Israel to pay high political, economical and social costs. It will also increase Israel's dependence on the U.S., causing Israel to lose more and more of its economic independence and political freedom of action.

. However, parallel to all the required changes, Israel's military power is still vital not only to the existence of the country and its population but to guarantee the peace process. The peace agreement with Egypt is the greatest Israeli achievement to date on the region. This peace agreement and others that, hopefully, will come in the future are based, first of all, on Israel's military power. Consequently, Israel must continue to maintain military superiority over the Arab world, mainly in the quality of manpower, command and leadership, and planning and motivation on one side and technological superiority on the other.

. No other country has done what Israel has done. Its achievements in six wars are impressive yet, at the same time, its losses and sacrifices for survival have been high. Israel has won the wars--it is now time to win the peace, a process that it might find even more challenging.

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